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Abstract 
 
It is a well-established fact that mothers' labour force participation reacts differently to 
different types of family benefits. It is also already well-known that cultural and religious 
factors have an impact on their labour force participation. But does the labour force 
reaction to family benefits differ among more religious mothers? In this paper, I analyse 
how both factors – benefits and religiosity – interact when it comes to the decision concern-
ing labour force participation. Firstly, I present a theoretical model which predicts that 
this difference exists. Secondly, I test this prediction in a sample of pooled cross-section 
data from 10 OECD countries using different measures to assess the extent of religiosity. 
There is evidence that religious mothers react less than non-religious mothers to 
increases in family benefits. I also find important differences among various religious 
affiliations. These results imply that trends in religiosity should be considered when 
designing labour market policies. 
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Labour supply of women has increased remarkably in the last few decades in the OECD
(average increase from 56 to 73 percent 1981-2003). Much of this is due to rising em-
ployment rates of mothers with children. I am therefore especially interested in mothers
because nding the right family-work-balance is still the biggest challenge for women.
They work more in part-time jobs and at home than men, independent of factors like
education or marital status.
Mothers show dierent reactions in the labour market depending on what kind of
public benet is invested in their families. Cash benets should support families with
direct nancial help. Investments in kind, like child care institutions, are seen in most of
the OECD countries as the key investment to get mothers back into the labour market
after child-birth. In OECD countries there is a high cross-country variation of these family
benets as Figure 1 in the Appendix shows. The USA is one of the countries investing
least (0.7 percent of GDP annually) with a female working rate of 76 percent in contrast
to top country in the OECD which invested 3.5 percent of GDP annually in its families
with a female working rate of 87 percent in 2003. This means that all rich countries do
not necessarily spend a huge amount of money on their families and that there may be a
positive correlation between investment and female working participation.
Culture also plays an important role with regard to labour force participation. Regard-
ing, for example, the ratio of working to stay-at-home mothers depending on religiosity
in 10 OECD countries, it is noticable that there is a high variation across countries (see
Figure 2 in the Appendix). In Sweden, for example, the ratio diers remarkably between
religious and non-religious mothers in contrast to New Zealand where these two types of
mothers participate nearly in the same proportions in the labour market. In nearly every
country, mothers work considerably less when they have religious attitudes. In Finland,
for example, mothers work 19 percent less when they are religious in contrast to USA
with a dierence of 5 percent.
A missing contribution in literature is the analysis of how both factors - benets and
culture - interact when it comes to the decision concerning labour force participation.
Therefore, I use the example of cash and in kind benets and the cultural variable reli-
giosity. The hypothesis is that there is a dierence in labour market behaviour between
religious and non-religious mothers when the state provides monetary or non-monetary
incentives for families.
The rst key nding in this context is the more negative behaviour of religious mothers
2in comparison to non-religious mothers because of increasing cash benets when it comes
to the decision to work. Living in a Protestant area changes this inuence. The second
important key nding is that religious mothers decide less often in favour of labour force
participation than non-religious mothers if benets in kind are increased. All these eects
are especially found for mothers between 25-40 years.
My paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some background information
about the current discussion of the topic. I also provide a simple theoretical model in
section 3 to get an intuitive idea of the topic. Section 4 presents the data and method,
i.e. a short description of the dataset, a presentation of the econometric model used and
nally a description of the chosen variables. Section 5 examines the empirical results,
dierentiated in a baseline model and further investigations. Section 6 concludes with
some political implications.
2 Related Literature
In the traditional neoclassical theory of labour supply the individual chooses between
consumption goods and leisure. This consumption choice can be transformed into a set of
dierent other choices like market work, home production and leisure. Gronau (1977), for
example, presented a model where individuals maximise the amount of commodities. It
shows that an increase in income reduces market work, leaves home production unchanged
and increases leisure. In his model, an increase in the number of children is associated
with a transfer of time to child-related activities by increasing time at home.
Algan and Cahuc (2005) provided an intuitive labour supply model including a family
good, which is a composite of a good purchased at home and leisure time that spouses
spend together in family activities. The model predicts that more weight on the family
good decreases the labour supply of both men and women with a bigger impact on the
labour supply of women because they devote more time to housework and to family
activities. He does not specify reasons for putting more weight on family but moral
concepts are conceivable.
Regarding empirical inuences on female labour force participation there is also wide-
ranging literature. Firstly, there is evidence of a positive elasticity of childcare sup-
port (benets in kind) relating to womens' participation. Chevalier and Viitanen (2002)
showed this for women in the UK, Gelbach (2002) for single mothers in the United States.
Jaumotte (2003) conrms this positive impact in her study and points out that the ef-
fectiveness of publicly provided childcare can be reduced by the following two types of
3substitution eects. On the one hand working mothers who previously bought private
childcare services may substitute this with publicly funded childcare. On the other hand
childcare subsidies may encourage working mothers to switch from unpaid and informal
childcare arrangements to paid and formal ones. A full subsidisation of all non-parental
care would induce a ten percent increase in employment of mothers, but a 19 percent
increase in the use of paid-for childcare arrangements (Blau and Hagy, 1998).
Secondly, regarding the inuence of cash investments like child allowances, Jaumotte
(2003) found a clear negative inuence on participation, especially on part-time participa-
tion because here the income eect is large enough to induce a reduction in participation.
There is also a lot of literature dealing with the inuence of religiosity as cultural
values on outcome variables like labour supply of women.
Guiso et al. (2006) gave a denition of culture including religious beliefs, which inuence
economic outcomes, transfered from previous generations, rather than having voluntarily
accumulated.1 This pattern of economic inuence is also conrmed by Becker (1996)
and Bisin and Verdier (2000). Hiller (2008) described religious norms as persistent and
not much aected by agents' decisions. Referring to these papers it can be assumed
that, for most individuals, religiosity is a time-invariant cultural norm. There is the
well-established fact that religiosity often has a negative impact on female labour force
participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2007). Myers (1996) found evidence that non-working
wives with working husbands increase their ability to transmit their religious beliefs and
practises to their children which leads to a stricter sexual divison of labour. This means
that the work decision of a mother is a conscious decision based on moral standards. This
religious behaviour also leads to closer family relationships (Brody et al., 1996).
The use of religiosity as a variable varies across studies. Guiso et al. (2003), for example,
worked in their paper with dierent indicators of religiosity, like being atheist, brought
up religiously, currently religious, and actively religious.
Moreover, there are several other factors which inuence the female labour force par-
ticipation and specically that of mothers. These are only briey referred to here. Higher
education2, better profession, higher income and a greater age all have a positive impact
(Alesina and Giuliano 2007).
1They dene culture "as those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation." (Guiso et al., 2006, p. 2).
2Following Becker's (1964) human capital theory, the likelihood of labour force participation should
increase, the more people invest in their human capital.
4Other factors like an increased number of children have a negative impact on the labour
force participation of their mothers (Bonin and Euwals, 2002).
Furthermore, there is a positive correlation between the macro variable growth rate of
GDP and female labour force rate, especially in OECD countries (Goldin, 1994).
Another inuence on female labour supply comes from the unemployment rate in a specic
country because of the discouragement hypothesis (van Ham et al., 2001). This hypothe-
sis states that a person feels discouraged or demoralised by high regional unemployment
and hence stays out of the labour market.
3 The model
This section assesses the possible inuence of religiosity, family benets and the interaction
between both on a mother's decision to work and to care for her child. To analyse these
determinants, the theoretical strategy is to investigate a household, which consists of a
man and a woman as parents3 and a child in caring age. In this family, the man works
full-time in the market in exchange for a net wage wm which he invests completely in the
budget of the family. Thus, total available time is standardized on a xed amount of a
man's market work mm and leisure time lm. For simplication it can be assumed that
mm = 1 due to the low subsitution elasticity between work and leisure of the man. By
contrast, the woman has more options. She shares available time between working in the
market (denoted by mw), time invested in child education ew (which is consistent with
household work)4 and leisure time lw (Becker, 1985). Accordingly, female work equals
total time, minus hours spent on child education, minus hours spent on leisure
mw = 1   ew   lw: (1)
Abstaining from entering into the labour market means that the woman rejects the wage
oered to her by the market. This wage loss is the price of her input in the production of
child education or leisure (Gronau, 1973).
For producing a child education good E it is necessary that time is spent with the child
by the woman or by another person. I assume that the family has access to a professional
3For simplication, I assume that the couple is married and has one child. The couple lives homoga-
mously, this means that both have the same life attitudes like religiosity (Bisin and Verdier, 2000).
4That includes all jobs during the day, which increase the quality of the child's upbringing such as
educating the child, transfering personal qualities and values to the child, looking after the child etc.
5nanny who takes care of the child for a certain time (denoted by en). E stands for building
up human capital of the child.5 This good is discussed more in detail in the following
sections.
Family utility u follows a Cobb-Douglas function and depends on consumption of a
numeraire good c purchased in the market, woman's leisure time lw, E as discussed above
as well as child education directly in the following way
u(c;lw;E;ew) = lnc +  lnlw +  lnE + Rlnew
with  = 1         R. The parameters , ,  reect the dierent weights put on the
respective goods (;; > 0). R > 0 is a also a weighting factor, which measures the
strength of religiosity of the woman. If a woman is religious (R > 0) there is additional
positive utility from staying at home with the child because this enables the woman to
educate her child by herself with her own moral concept (Meyers 1996). This implies that
she values the marginal product of staying at home higher than that of working in the
market or leisure (Gronau 1973). The higher R is the lower the weights are on the other
goods, like consumption or leisure. If a woman is non-religious (R = 0) she does not
put that much weight on the education of her child by herself and does not additionally
benet in the sense of rising utility from ew.
3.1 Family cash benets
In this rst case it is assumed that there is full substitution of time spent with the child
by the nanny or the mother. The child education good is represented by the following
production function
E = en + ew:6 (2)
The family receives cash benets I of the respective state which increase the budget
of the family directly. The familiy has the possibility to hire a nanny and pay for her
5I refer at this point to a denition of Sullivan and Sherin (2003): Human capital is the skills and
knowledge gained by a person through education and experience, embodied in the ability to produce
economic value.
6ew can be weighted by a productivity factor M (M 2 R+). At this point it is assumed that M = 1
because it is not the aim of the model to give answers to dierent productivity types of women. If M > 1
the woman can use her special relationship to the children in her work with the children.
6services (wn > 0).7
The budget constraint of the family is:
c + wnen = wwmw + wmmm + I; (3)
where ww and wn are the market wages of the woman and of the nanny. Market wages
of the parents consist of gross wage earnings minus payments to the government (taxes,
social security payments etc.). Market wage of the nanny is a gross wage.
Being interested in the opportunity costs of the familiy the constraint can be rewritten
c + ww(lw + ew) + wnen = ww + wm + I: (4)
Thus, the households' maximization problem can be written as
max
fc;lw;ew;eng
lnc +  lnlw +  ln(en + ew) + Rlnew
subject to the specic budget constraint.
The optimal working time of the woman can be derived from solving the maximization
problem (the FOC's and the solutions of lw, ew and en see Figure 5 in the Appendix)
mw = 1  
(wm + ww + I)((ww   wn) + Rww)
ww(ww   wn)
: (5)
According to the rst and second order conditions, the model yields the following main
predictions:8
 When family cash benets are increased, the woman will invest less time in working.
This is due to the income eect. She uses the available time for increasing the time
she spends caring for her child and her leisure time.
 The model also predicts that increased religiosity of the woman has a negative eect
on her labour force participation.
7I do without the inclusion of non-labour income other than I, because I concentrate on the analysis
of increasing the budget by having an institutional benet.
8To get a denite result the prediction is made under the following restriction: ww > wn, which means
that the focus of investigation is put on mothers who are better educated than a nanny. It is especially
interesting to analyse these mothers. Because of their high earning possibilities they have a real choice
between hiring a nanny or staying at home. Combining the parameters extremely could still mean that
mw > 1. If this is the case this does not interfere with the general interpretation.
7 Regarding the interaction between cash benets and religiosity the model shows that
religious mothers (with higher values of R) react more negatively with increased cash
benets towards their work decision than non-religious mothers. If a woman is non-
religious she uses the money of the state for relatively more additional nanny hours
in contrast to religious women who reduce the nanny hours despite the extra money.
3.2 Family benets in kind
In this second case it is assumed that there is full substitution between time spent of
the child in a public institution with a nanny or the mother. Public institutions are now
provided because the respective government is supporting families with benets in kind.
This is consistent in the model with complimentary hours in a day-care center.9 This
means that the child education good is now produced by
E =  e + en + ew; (6)
where  e stands for the amount of hours which are provided by the state.
In this case the budget constraint is changed into10
c + ww(lw + ew) + wnen = ww + wm: (7)
Thus, the households maximization is now
max
fc;lw;ew;eng
lnc +  lnlw +  ln( e + en + ew) + Rlnew:
The optimal working time of the woman can again be derived from solving the max-
imization problem (the FOC's and the solutions of lw, ew and en see Figure 6 in the
Appendix)
mw = 1  





( ewn(1 + R=) + ww + wm)
ww
: (8)
According to the rst and second order conditions this model is able to predict the fol-
lowing correlations:11
9Beyond that, the family can buy additional hours provided by the private sector, if necessary.
10The budget constraint follows the same scheme as the constraint in the previous chapter.
11To get a denite result the prediction is made under the following plausible restrictions: (1) ww > wn,
8 When publicly provided childcare is expanded mothers decrease their own caring
time and the caring time of the nanny. This means that the working time of mothers
increases as long as leisure is nearly constant.
 With increasing religiosity of the woman her working time decreases. This result is
consistent with the predictions of the model above.
 When a religious woman is exposed to increasing publicly provided childcare she
does not increase her working time as much as a non-religious woman. The mone-
tary argument of free childcare does not totally convince her because of her moral
standards. This implies that publicly provided childcare does not aect all mothers
in the same way concerning their labour force participation.
4 Data and Method
4.1 Data Source
I combine data of an international survey at the level of individuals with separate macro
data. On the microlevel, I use two waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) (1995-1998,
1999-2001), which provides especially key questions relating to religiosity beside socio-
demographic variables.12 On the macrolevel, I use the Social expenditure dataset (SED)
of the OECD, which includes information about family benets for all OECD countries.
Other macro datasets (OECD, Worldbank and IMF) complement my dataset with socio-
economic information of the countries studied.
By merging all these dierent datasets, I get a pooled cross-sectional dataset of individuals
(1995-2000). My analysis includes the following 10 OECD countries: Australia, Canada,
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United
States. In the main analysis mothers aged 25 to 40 are included. This ensures that these
women are on the one hand in their prime age for work, meaning that their education is
which corresponds to the prediction of subsection 3.1; (2) R < 1=2: the more religious a women is the
less weight is put on the child education good provided by other people.
12The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and political change. It is
conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities worldwide. The data and insights
produced by the WVS help one to understand the role of human values and beliefs in societal change.
All interviews are conducted face to face by a local eld organization and are supervised by academic
researchers. Random probability samples are aimed for where possible.
9nished and they are not retired yet. On the other hand rearing children is concentrated
in the age span between 25 and 40 years (e.g. mean age of mothers at rst childbirth
varies between 25.1 in USA and 29.3 in Spain in 2005, OECD 2009).
In the case of incomplete categorical control variables I decided to use an extra dummy
variable per categorical variable, which gives information about item non-response. This
extra dummy represents the omitted category in the regressions. On the individual level
the baseline dataset contains 3,584 observations.
4.2 Econometric Model
This section assesses the possible inuence of religiosity, family benets and the interaction
between both on mothers' decisions to work. To analyse these determinants, the empirical
strategy is to use a binary probit regression model. The dependent variable is a 0-1-
variable which indicates whether or how mothers decide to participate in the labour
market (for more information see 4.3).
The baseline estimation equation is
P(y = 1jX) = (  Benefits cashct +   Benefits in kindct +   Strong religious tiesict
+   Benefits cashct  Strong religious tiesict
+   Benefits in kindct  Strong religious tiesict + C)
C    Cict +   Cct:
i := factor varies between individuals
t := factor varies over time
c := factor varies between countries;
where
 is the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribution. Besides the listed
variables of interest, Cict is a vector of socio-demographic covariates of mothers and Cct a
vector of socio-economic factors of countries.13
13There are no country xed eects included in the model due to the presence of country-level explana-
tory variables. Because of the limited number of points in time (1995-2000) there are no time xed eects
included in the model.
10When the model is non-linear the interaction eect cannot be evaluated by looking
at the sign, magnitude or statistical signicance of the coecient of the probit model.
The correct marginal eect requires computing the cross derivative for continuous vari-
ables or cross dierence for dummy variables (Ai and Norton 2003) which are described
as composite eects. Therefore, I evaluate the composite eects of the variables of inter-
est and the interacted variables at the mean, which ensures getting correctly computed
marginal eects and signicance levels of the interaction terms. The other covariates are
also provided as marginal eects at the mean computed with the Stata command mfx.
Since the data includes both individual characteristics of the mother as well as na-
tional indicators (and every country has more than one respondent), the data need to be
clustered. Clustering at the country level ensures that standard errors are correct for the
downward bias induced by aggregated determinants. The standard errors produced by
this procedure are equally robust to heteroscedasticity.
4.3 Choice of variables
4.3.1 Variables of interest
Since the objective of the paper is to investigate the probability of mothers working, the
rst dependent variable "labour force participation" is measured by a dummy variable,
which equals one if a mother is in the labour force (employed, self-employed or unem-
ployed) and equals zero if she is not. More than four fths of the observed mothers fulll
one of the criteria of working.14
The second dependent variable "full-time working" concretises the decision on the amount
of working hours and describes therefore the changeover from working less to working
more. Therefore, it equals one if the mother works full-time or is self-employed and
equals zero if she stays at home or works part-time.15
There are dierent possibilities of integrating religiosity as a valid variable of interest
in the model. One way is to measure the strength of religious ties by looking at two WVS
variables, which are strongly positively correlated with each other.
1454.3% of these mothers work full time, 15.5% work part time, 4.3% are self employed, 7.9% are
unemployed and 18.0% are housewives.
15A detailed statistical overview of the used variables and further information about the data and
variables are shown in the Tables 5-7 in the Appendix.
11The rst variable captures beliefs relating to the importance of religion in an individual's
life. I focus on the answer that religion is very important in life. The second variable asks
how often the respondent attends religious services during the year. The focus for this
investigation is on mothers who attend religious service at least once a month to measure
current religiosity. I combine these two variables by considering only those mothers as
being religious who fullled the demanded criteria in both questions. The created dummy
variable "strong religious ties" is then used as a variable for strong religiosity. About
17% of mothers in the dataset are specied as having strong religious ties (23.1% think
that religion is very important in daily life, 27.1% are actively religious) with a high
variance among the analysed countries. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows my religiosity
variable and compares it to the share of respondents belonging to a denomination. It
shows that the Czech Republic and the Scandinavian countries are those countries where
mothers are less religious although the denomination rates especially in the Skandinavian
countries are relatively high. In contrast, Canada and USA have denomination rates in
the middle eld but the highest rates of religious mothers. Figure 4 in the Appendix
gives an overview of the main denominations mothers belong to in the dataset. We can
see that the Scandinavian countries, Australia and New Zealand have mainly protestant
mothers. In the Czech Repbulic, Canada and Spain mothers are predominantly Catholics.
In countries like Germany or USA the share of Protestants and Catholics is nearly the
same. In USA there is also one third which includes other Christian denominations,
Muslims and other religions.
The dataset of family benets on country level provided by the OECD gives an
overview of dierent public expenditures for families (cash and in kind) over time, mea-
sured in percent of GDP. In this sample, 1.2% cash and 0.7% in kind were expended for
families per year. Reforms in transfers to families in the specic countries are reected
by increasing or decreasing expenditures. From the macro perspective the amount of
benets a state invests in its families reects the importance of families and their needs
in a country. It can be concluded that investing a lot of money in families means that
there is more public discussion about topics like family-work-balance and exible working
conditions for mothers and may imply a transition process in attitudes of society towards
the family role of mothers. Furthermore, high benets can incentivise men and women
without children to decide in favour of having children.
Cash investments are predominantly translated into child benets which increase the bud-
get of the family directly. At this point it is important to mention that these data provided
by the OECD do not inlcude the tax splitting issue. Investments in benets in kind are
mainly made in child day care in every analysed country. So I assume that these benets
12improve the infrastructure of childcare and support the families in getting their children
a place in the nursery.
I am especially interested in the change of the eect of family benets on the female
labour force participation if mothers dier in their religiosity. Therefore, I include the
interaction between religiosity and family benets as variable of interest in my model.
4.3.2 Control variables
In controlling for mother's socio-demographic factors and dierent macro variables16 I
follow the relevant literature.
Furthermore, the size of the service sector per country is used because this sector employs
women above-average (ILO, 2007). Finally, average religiosity per country (calculated on
the basis of the micro variable "strong religious ties") is included to control for possible
dierent levels of answers within a country.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Baseline model without versus with interaction terms
Firstly I present the results of the main interesting variables in the baseline model with-
out and with interaction terms in comparison to the literature and theory. Secondly I
discuss the results of the integrated interaction terms. Finally, I present the results of the
covariates (see Table 1).
As expected, increasing cash benets generally has a negative inuence on the prob-
ability of working of a mother (ceteris paribus) in both models. This conrms the theo-
retical model. The eect is only signicant in relation to the decision to work full-time.
This means that mothers especially use the possibility of additional public money (income
eect) to reduce the amount of full-time work.
There is also evidence for a robust positive signicant inuence of benets in kind on the
work decision of a mother in both models. This means that public investments in child
16The selection of the incuded covariates occurs in consideration of the problem of endogenous variables.
Thus, the variables are age, family status, number of children, education, living area, denomination, social
class, being chief-earner, living with parents, female unemployment rate, GDP per capita (to measure for
wealth and income in a country) and as growth rate (to measure dynamics on the labour market).
13day care help mothers decide to work, even more so to work more than part-time. Other
papers (e.g. Jaumotte, 2003) and the theoretical model have shown similar results. The
absolute value of inuence of benets in kind is bigger than the inuence of cash benets.
Religiosity shows also the expected negative sign, which is predicted by my theory. But
this result is only signicant when interaction terms are integrated in the model. Be-
ing religious leads to a decreasing probability of taking part in the labour market. The
decision to work full-time is inuenced in particular (signicant at the one percent level).
Regarding the results of the integrated interaction terms there is rstly signicant ev-
idence for a more negative behaviour of religious mothers in comparison to non-religious
mothers towards increased cash benets when it comes to the decision to work full-time.
It can be concluded that especially a religious mother uses the additional income for
substituting normal income from a full-time job (and takes the opportunity of reducing
working time or quitting work). Altogether this supports the mother in daily life in living
out her religious attitudes.
Secondly, there is also signicant evidence that religious mothers decide less often in
favour of labour force participation and full-time work than non-religious mothers if ben-
ets in kind are increased. This means that the group of religious mothers is not as much
aected by benets in kind as the group of non-religious mothers. This is consistent with
the model which predicts that the monetary argument of free childcare does not totally
convince religious mothers because of their moral standards.
It is remarkable that the eects on full-time work are more signicant than those of work-
ing generally when family benets are increased, especially in the case of religious mothers.
As the literature conrms, transmitting religious beliefs to children aords presence of the
mother in the family (Myers 1996). The underlying moral concepts inuence the mother
in her decision to work. Working less than full-time is more manageable with her religious
philosophy than working the whole day. This can explain the more signicant eects.
After analysing the results of the covariates it can generally be determined that most
of the eects do not change considerably when interaction terms are included in the
model. As in the literature, belonging to a higher class has a positive inuence especially
on the full-time work decision. Furthermore, a negative signicant eect is apparent for
25-34-year-olds and a negative insignicant eect of having a higher number of children as
well as higher unemployment rates. Living unmarried or with the parents implies greater
probability of taking part in the labour force as well as being chiefearner. The question
about a possible inuence of belonging to a certain denomination can not be answered
14at this point.17 Regarding the results of the macro variables the positive inuence of
increasing wealth in a country can be conrmed because higher income-levels denote
more incentive to work, also for mothers. This could point to higher employment and
earning opportunities for women (Goldin, 1994). In contrast, increasing dynamics in the
labour market inuence the labour force decision of mothers negatively. A reason could be
that more dynamics mean more exible working arrangements but not necessarily more
jobs.18














Family cash benets (1) -0.0137 -0.0717* -0.0148 -0.061*
[0.0126] [0.0315] [0.0125] [0.0309]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.0924* 0.301*** 0.107** 0.304***
[0.0431] [0.0462] [0.0411] [0.0383]
Strong religious ties (d,1) -0.0126 -0.0867 -0.035* -0.138***
[0.0156] [0.0447] [.02036] [.02774]
Strong religious ties x cash benets (1) -0.003 -0.004*
[0.0032] [0.0020]
Strong religious ties x benets in kind (1) -0.021* -0.018***
[0.0131] [0.0032]
CONTROL VARIABLES
25-29 years old (d) -0.0255 -0.0643** -0.0253 -0.0627**
[0.0181] [0.0211] [0.0182] [0.0215]
35-40 years old (d) 0.0121 0.0196 0.0119 0.0185
[0.0147] [0.0244] [0.0146] [0.0240]
Married (d) 0.129 0.298 0.128 0.300
[0.116] [0.152] [0.116] [0.155]
Living unmarried with a partner (d) 0.105** 0.219* 0.104** 0.218
[0.0361] [0.108] [0.0361] [0.112]
Living alone (d) 0.0579 -0.0116 0.0570 -0.0122
[0.0487] [0.111] [0.0485] [0.113]
Number children -0.0196 -0.0340 -0.0194 -0.0329
[0.0122] [0.0175] [0.0123] [0.0170]
Continued on next page...
17Although the results indicate that being Catholic or Muslim (other denomination) has much more
negative inuence on labour force participation than being Protestant. To get a clearer picture of be-
haviour patterns because of belonging to dierent confessions it is necessary to make further investigations
(see particularly Chapter 5.2.3).
18An extension of the model by covariates consisting of one variable of interest multiplied with one
control variable to get more information about religion (e.g. strong religious ties x number of children)
does not change the results signicantly. Therefore, these variables are not integrated in the following
regressions.













Low education (ISCED 1/2) (d) -0.275** -0.205 -0.279** -0.232
[0.0942] [0.146] [0.0976] [0.148]
Middle education (ISCED 3/4) (d) -0.340** -0.303* -0.346** -0.331*
[0.126] [0.135] [0.131] [0.135]
High education (ISCED 5/6) (d) -0.311** -0.262 -0.315** -0.290*
[0.110] [0.136] [0.117] [0.136]
Living in village < 10:000 (d) -0.0136 0.132* -0.0138 0.132*
[0.0511] [0.0556] [0.0501] [0.0534]
Living in city 10.000-500.000 (d) -0.000451 0.0829 -0.00121 0.0814
[0.0339] [0.0522] [0.0326] [0.0485]
Living in city > 500:000 (d) 0.00285 0.103 0.00362 0.105
[0.0326] [0.0686] [0.0322] [0.0660]
Belonging to upper class (d) 0.0471 -0.0215 0.0471 -0.0208
[0.0533] [0.115] [0.0524] [0.118]
Belonging to middle class (d) 0.0251 0.111* 0.0237 0.111*
[0.0295] [0.0554] [0.0286] [0.0554]
Belonging to working class (d) 0.0358 0.0897 0.0341 0.0895
[0.0213] [0.0564] [0.0208] [0.0564]
Belonging to lower class (d) -0.0920 -0.256** -0.0969 -0.257**
[0.0751] [0.0912] [0.0743] [0.0900]
Chiefearner (d) 0.265*** 0.536*** 0.263*** 0.538***
[0.0233] [0.0270] [0.0227] [0.0268]
Catholic (d) -0.0358 0.0124 -0.0374 0.0108
[0.0205] [0.0356] [0.0207] [0.0358]
Protestant (d) -0.00683 0.0250 -0.0112 0.0188
[0.0212] [0.0203] [0.0212] [0.0199]
Other denomination (d) -0.0463 0.00573 -0.0482 -0.00113
[0.0331] [0.0212] [0.0325] [0.0221]
Living with parents (d) 0.0554*** 0.120* 0.0562*** 0.124*
[0.0147] [0.0517] [0.0150] [0.0517]
Female Unemploymentrate -0.0172 -0.0124 -0.0179 -0.0152
[0.0107] [0.0187] [0.0112] [0.0184]
Female unemploymentrate x low education 0.0275** -0.000975 0.0283** 0.00189
[0.00866] [0.0162] [0.00910] [0.0166]
Female unemploymentrate x middle education 0.0278** 0.0125 0.0285** 0.0156
[0.00849] [0.0165] [0.00911] [0.0165]
Female unemploymentrate x high education 0.0367*** 0.0165 0.0374*** 0.0196
[0.00891] [0.0150] [0.00964] [0.0149]
GDP p.a. (% change) -0.0352** -0.0481** -0.0349** -0.0473**
[0.0110] [0.0181] [0.0106] [0.0172]
GDP p.c. in TUSD (PPP) 0.0370** 0.0627*** 0.0366** 0.0617***
[0.0118] [0.0165] [0.0115] [0.0154]
Size service sector (TUSD per working capita) -15.62* -50.55*** -15.31* -49.52***
[7.947] [9.903] [7.783] [9.206]
Average religiosity per country (strong) 0.271 1.594*** 0.271 1.524***
[0.243] [0.350] [0.236] [0.307]
Constant yes yes
N 3584 3584
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
Continued on next page...













(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold).
5.2 Further investigations
5.2.1 Relevance of the age of mothers
Which of the observed eects are only reduced to the analysed age group of mothers (25-40
years)? To answer this question I rstly analyse an expanded dataset of mothers in core
working age (25-54 years). Secondly, I take a look only at older mothers (between 40-54
years) who are mainly not involved anymore in caring for young children and belong to
an older generation, possibly with dierent attitudes towards work. All the main results
are provided in Table 2, the detailed results in Table 8 in the Appendix.19
Regarding all three regressions, the main eects remain the same in their signs but
change in their signicances or magnitudes.
In detail, religiosity plays a negative role for mothers in all age groups but the eect size
decreases when observing mothers in the expanded age group 25-54 years. This comes
from the fact that mothers of younger age (where the education of young children plays
a more important role) are more inuenced by their religiosity than mothers of older age
when it comes to the work decision.
The negative eect of cash benets increases a bit if the dataset consits of mothers aged
25 to 54. Responsible for this are mothers between 40 and 54 years who make more
use of the additional money to reduce labour force participation (higher income eect)
than younger mothers. Religious mothers aged 40 to 54 react also more negatively than
younger mothers when cash benets are increased.
In contrast, more benets in kind promotes full-time work of 25-40-year-olds in partic-
ular. This implies that the improvement of caring institutions is especially important
for younger mothers who want to work. Furthermore, the weakened reaction of religious
mothers in the case of increasing benets in kind is also concentrated in this age group.
This argues for the importance of parental education of young children. It does not play
19For more precise results the focus of investigation is on the decision to full-time work.
17a role for older mothers.
All in all, the majority of interesting eects are found for mothers between 25-40 years.
This fact supports the decision to focus on these data.
Table 2: Probit regression models with dierent age groups of mothers with regard to
full-time working (marginal eects)
VARIABLES OF INTEREST MOTHERS 25-40 MOTHERS 25-54 MOTHERS 40-54
Family cash benets (1) -0.061* -0.0726*** -0.107***
[0.0309] [0.0203] [0.0204]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.304*** 0.170*** 0.0687*
[0.0383] [0.0321] [0.0371]
Strong religious ties (d,1) -0.138*** -0.095*** -0.064**
[.02774] [0.0220] [0.0296]
Strong religious ties x cash benets (1) -0.004* -0.005** -0.008**
[0.0020] [0.0023] [0.0038]
Strong religious ties x benets in kind (1) -0.018*** -0.0135*** 0.0056
[0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0035]
N 3584 7012 3748
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold); Empty cells: results not computable.
5.2.2 Alternative measures of religiosity
Are the variables "Religion very important" and "Actively religious" more precise in
measuring religiosity than "Strong religious ties"? To get an answer I analyse these
variables seperately and together (see Guiso et al. 2003) and compare them to the baseline
model. All the main results are presented in Table 3, the detailed results in Table 9 in
the Appendix.20
The rst interesting fact is that the marginal eects of the main variables of the dierent
regressions all have the same signs and they do not dier considerably in signicance
or magnitude. This implies that the dierent questions about religion are very robust.
Specically, the single used variable "Religion very important" has stronger eects than
the variable "Actively religious". The answer "Religion is very important in my life" has
more weight when it comes to the decision to work than the fact of attending religious
services regularily.
The second interesting fact is that putting both variables together in one model de-
20For more precise results the focus of investigation lies on the decision to work full-time and I put
focus on mothers between 25-40 years.
18creases the eects and their signicances, especially of the variable "Actively religious".
Comparing these results to the baseline model with the variable "Strong religious ties"
shows that the variable in the baseline model has stronger eects. The main reason is that
this variable requires the fullling of both demanded criteria of religiosity and therefore
measures religiosity more precisely. Furthermore, it is easier to interpret this one variable
than two single used variables. This supports the choice of using this variable.
Table 3: Probit regression models with alternative measures of religiosity (marginal ef-
fects)





Family cash benets (1) -0.0606* -0.0601* -0.059*
[0.0314] [0.0348] [0.0335]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.319***
[0.0327] [0.0392] [0.0336]
Religion very important (d,1) -0.1105*** -0.0946***
[0.0236] [0.0264]
Religion very important x cash benets (1) -0.0049* -0.0031*
[0.0019] [0.0016]
Religion very important x benets in kind (1) -0.0175*** -0.0165***
[0.0025] [0.0031]
Actively religious (1) -0.072** -0.0339
[0.0242] [0.0299]
Actively religious x cash benets (1) -0.0032 -0.0013
[0.0212] [0.0015]
Actively religious x benets in kind (1) -0.014*** 0.0072
[0.0043] [0.0060]
N 3584 3584 3584
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold).
5.2.3 Dierent aspects of denomination
Analysing religiosity also means looking at the inuences of the dierent denominations.
The rst investigation in this context gives additional information about the behaviour of
Catholic versus Protestant mothers.21 The aim is to determine whether if the denomina-
tion of a mother matters regarding her work decision when family benets are changed.
The second investigation examines possible dierent behaviour patterns of mothers if they
live in a predominantly Protestant or Catholic country. Religious majorities could have
dierent inuences on the development of society. Splitting up the sample into mothers
21Muslim mothers are not analysed because of small number of observations.
19living in more Protestant or Catholic countries22 could yield more detailed information.
All the main results are provided in Table 4, the detailed results in Table 10 in the
Appendix.23
On the one hand it can be shown that Protestant mothers show the same reactions
than mothers in the baseline model but with higher magnitudes. Especially Protestant
mothers with strong religious ties reduce their full-time work more than average religious
mothers when the state provides family benets. This is a surprising result because of the
rather modern attitudes of the Protestants towards women.24 In contrast, if a country is
mainly Protestant a controversial reaction of mothers on the interacted variable "Strong
religious ties x cash benets" can be seen.
On the other hand it can be shown that for Catholic mothers respectively for mothers
living in a Catholic area cash benets are very important. They use the expected income
eect of cash benets (religious Catholics react more intensely) more than the other groups
of mothers. Other eects are not veriable regarding Catholic mothers.
Table 4: Probit regression models with dierent aspects of denomination with regard





VARIABLES OF INTEREST Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant
Family cash benets (1) -0.3159** -0.174** -0.362***
[0.1239] [0.0618] [0.0587]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.00559 0.601*** 0.424*** 0.243***
[0.126] [0.0532] [0.0457] [0.0678]
Strong religious ties (d,1) -0.0363 -0.1845*** -0.1472*** -0.1244
[0.0534] [0.0455] [0.0261] [0.1102]
Strong religious ties x cash benets (1) -0.0048 -0.0118** -0.0775*** 0.0381*
[0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0229] [0.0196]
Strong religious ties x benets in kind (1) 0.0001 -0.0407*** -0.0261*** -0.0264*
[0.0020] [0.0087] [0.0040] [0.0139]
N 1007 1309 2544 1040
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold); Catholic countries: CAN, CZE, ESP, Protestant countries: AUS, FIN, GER, NZE, NOR, SWE, USA;
Empty cells: results not computable.
22Protestant countries: Australia, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and USA;
Catholic countries: Canada, Czech Republic, Spain.
23I put focus on mothers between 25-40 years who decide on full-time working.
24At this point it is not dierentiated between the dierent Protestant groups.
206 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to analyse the dierent reactions of mothers depending on their
religiosity when family benets are increased. At this point some interesting eects arise.
Firstly, it can be shown that both religiosity and cash benets have a negative impact
on full-time work of mothers. Secondly, benets in kind have a positive impact on the
decision to participate in the labour market of a mother. Finally, religious mothers decide
more often against working in contrast to non-religious mothers if benets in kind are
increased and against working full-time if benets in general are increased. This means
that this group of mothers is not stimulated in the same way as non-religious mothers
based on their specic life-philosophy. This eect can be observed especially in the case
of opting for full-time work because this decision is hardly compatible with their moral
concept. Several robustness checks conrm these results.
Present research shows that religious trends should be considered when designing
labour market policies because religious attitudes have (beside other factors) a direct
impact on the decision of mothers to join the labour force. Other possible political areas
of relevance are the family as well as demographic and integration policies.
Appropriate further research would be a more detailed analysis of the dierentiation
among religious groups of mothers (especially Protestant and Catholic mothers) and how
much these mothers are inuenced in their individual work decision by their surroundings
(husband, parents etc.).
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Finland Germany New Zealand Norway Spain Sweden  USA
Cash benefits Benefits in kind
Source: Own calculations based on data of Stat.OECD.
Note: Excludes tax advantages for families with/without children.






























Source: Own calculations based on data of the World Value Survey (1995-2000).
Note: (1) Only mothers between 25 and 40 years are considered; working includes full-time and
part-time working, self-employment, unemployment and being student; stay at home means being
housewife, retired or something else. - (2) Denition of being religious see Chapter 4.3.
















Norway Spain Sweden  USA
Belonging to a denomination Being religious
Source: Own calculations based on data of the World Value Survey (1995-2000).
Note: (1) Only mothers between 25 and 40 years are considered. - (2) Denition of being religious see
Chapter 4.3.
















Norway Spain Sweden  USA
Catholic Protestant Other
Source: Own calculations based on data of the World Value Survey (1995-2000).
Note: (1) Only mothers between 25 and 40 years are considered. - (2) Denition of being religious see
Chapter 4.3.
27Figure 5: Family cash benets: Maximization problem
The FOC's look as the following:
(1) =c     0,
(2) =lw   ww  0,
(3) =(en + ew)   wn  0,
(4) =(en + ew) + R=ew   ww  0,
(5) ww + wm + I   c   ww(lw + ew)   wnen  0.
By solving this maximization problem, I can derive the (optimal) caring time of mother and nanny
as well as leisure time of the mother, as
ew =








(wm + ww + I)
ww
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Figure 6: Family benets in kind: Maximization problem
The FOC's look as the following:
(1) =c     0,
(2) =lw   ww  0,
(3) =( e + en + ew)   wn  0,
(4) =( e + en + ew) + R=ew   ww  0,
(5) ww + wm   c   ww(lw + ew)   wnen  0.
By solving this maximization problem, I can derive the (optimal) caring time of mother and nanny
as well as leisure time of the mother, as
ew =






ww + wm    ewn(
1  R
 )((ww=wn   1)   R)
ww   wn
lw =
( ewn(1 + R=) + ww + wm)
ww
:
28Table 5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Labour force participation 0.821 0.384 0 1
Full-time working 0.586 0.493 0 1
Family cash benets 1.248 0.816 0.1 2.4
Family benets in kind 0.696 0.473 0.1 1.9
Strong religious ties 0.166 0.372 0 1
25-29 years old 0.201 0.401 0 1
30-34 years old 0.336 0.472 0 1
35-40 years old 0.463 0.499 0 1
Married 0.67 0.47 0 1
Living unmarried with a partner 0.121 0.326 0 1
Living alone 0.206 0.404 0 1
Familystatus missings 0.003 0.058 0 1
Number children 1.938 0.758 0 3
Number children missings 0.009 0.093 0 1
Low education (ISCED 1/2) 0.477 0.5 0 1
Middle education (ISCED 3/4) 0.223 0.417 0 1
High education (ISCED 5/6) 0.288 0.453 0 1
Education missings 0.011 0.106 0 1
Living in village < 10.000 0.19 0.392 0 1
Living in city 10.000-500.000 0.247 0.431 0 1
Living in city > 500.000 0.307 0.461 0 1
Living missings 0.257 0.437 0 1
Belonging to upper class 0.007 0.083 0 1
Belonging to middle class 0.570 0.495 0 1
Belonging to working class 0.314 0.464 0 1
Belonging to lower class 0.051 0.22 0 1
Belonging to class missings 0.058 0.234 0 1
Chiefearner 0.503 0.5 0 1
Chiefearner missings 0.047 0.211 0 1
Catholic 0.281 0.45 0 1
Protestant 0.365 0.482 0 1
Other denomination 0.076 0.266 0 1
Denomination missings 0.277 0.448 0 1
Living with parents 0.049 0.215 0 1
Living with parents missings 0.006 0.076 0 1
Female Unemploymentrate 6.285 3.472 2.632 15.561
GDP p.a. (% change) 3.013 1.866 -1 5.23
GDP p.c. in TUSD (PPP) 23.323 4.919 13.965 32.994
Size service sector (TUSD per working capita) 0.035 0.009 0.018 0.055
Average religiosity per country (strong) 0.167 0.157 0.026 0.515
N 3584
Note: Observations per country per year (mothers 25-40 years): AUS 431 (1995), CAN 390 (2000),
CZE 228 (1998), FIN 226 (1996), GER 552 (1997), NZE 237 (1998), NOR 270 (1996),
ESP 219 (1995) 203 (2000), SWE 200 (1996), USA 356 (1995) 272 (1999).
Table 6: Details on the used variables
Variable Description Source
Labour force participation = 1 if mother is employed, self-employed, unemployed or a
student
=0 if mother is housewife, retired or something else.
WVS, data extracted
on 07/27/09
Continued on next page...
29... table 6 continued
Variable Description Source
Full-time working = 1 if mother works full-time or is self-employed








Strong religious ties =1 if religion is very important for mother and if she attends
religious services more than once a month
WVS, data extracted
on 07/27/09
Female unemployment rate Women between 25 to 54 years OECD.Stat, data ex-
tracted on 07/29/09
GDP annually (% change) Growth rate measured in percent OECD.Stat, data ex-
tracted on 07/29/09
GDP per capita Measured in per head, USD, current prices, current PPPs OECD.Stat, data ex-
tracted on 07/29/09
Size service sector Transactions in service sector (trade, repair, hotels, restau-
rants, nancial intermediation, real estate, renting and busi-
ness activities, other service activities), USD PPP per working
capita (25-54 years old)
OECD.Stat, data ex-
tracted on 07/29/09
Average religiosity per country
(strong)
Own calculations based on micro variable strong religious ties WVS, data extracted
on 07/27/09
Weighting factor Provide a 4-digit weight variable to correct sample to reect
national distributions of key variables. It is especially impor-
tant to correct for education. For example, if the sample con-
tains twice as many university-educated respondents as there
are in the adult population as a whole, members of this group
should be given a weight of .5.
WVS, data extracted
on 07/27/09
Table 7: Description of used questions of the World Value Survey
Original Question Possible Answers Variables
Are you employed now or not? If yes, about
how many hours a week? If more than one job:
only for the main job.
1)Full time employee (30 hours a week or
more)















Apart from weddings and funerals, about how
often do you attend religious services these
days?
1)More than once a month
2)Only on special holy days
3)Once a year
4)Less often/ never, practically never
Strong religious ties
Can you tell me your year of birth, please?




Continued on next page...
30... table 7 continued
Original Question Possible Answers Variables
Are you currently... 1)Married






Living unmarried with a part-
ner
Living alone








8)Eight or more children
Number children
What is the highest educational level that you
have attained?
1. No formal education
2. Incomplete primary school
3. Complete primary school
4. Incomplete secondary school: techni-
cal/vocational type
5. Complete secondary school: techni-
cal/vocational type
6. Incomplete secondary: university-
preparatory type
7. Complete secondary: university-
preparatory type
8. Some university-level education, without
degree
9. University-level education, with degree
Low education (ISCED 1/2)
Middle education (ISCED 3/4)
High education (ISCED 5/6)
People sometimes describe themselves as be-
longing to the working class, the middle class,
or the upper or lower class. Would you de-






Belonging to upper class
Belonging to middle class
Belonging to working class
Belonging to lower class
Size of town 1 Under 2,000
2 2,000 - 5,000
3 5 - 10,000
4 10 - 20,000
5 20 - 50,000
6 50 - 100,000
7 100 - 500,000
8 500,000 and more
Living in village < 10:000
Living in city 10.000-500.000
Living in city > 500:000
Do you belong to a religion or religious denom-
ination? If yes, which one?

















Continued on next page...
31... table 7 continued
Original Question Possible Answers Variables
Do you live with your parents? 1)Yes
2)No
Living with parents
Table 8: Probit regression models with dierent age groups of mothers with regard to
full-time working (marginal eects)
VARIABLES OF INTEREST MOTHERS 25-40 MOTHERS 25-54 MOTHERS 40-54
Family cash benets (1) -0.061* -0.0726*** -0.107***
[0.0309] [0.0203] [0.0204]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.304*** 0.170*** 0.0687*
[0.0383] [0.0321] [0.0371]
Strong religious ties (d,1) -0.138*** -0.095*** -0.064**
[.02774] [0.0220] [0.0296]
Strong religious ties x cash benets (1) -0.004* -0.005** -0.008**
[0.0020] [0.0023] [0.0038]
Strong religious ties x benets in kind (1) -0.018*** -0.0135*** 0.0056
[0.0032] [0.0029] [0.0035]
CONTROL VARIABLES
25-29 years old (d) -0.0627** -0.0627* 0.0291
[0.0215] [0.0288] [0.0151]
35-40 years old (d) 0.0185 -0.0218 -0.0551**
[0.0240] [0.0172] [0.0188]
Married (d) 0.300 0.211* 0.0839
[0.155] [0.0963] [0.101]
Living unmarried with a partner (d) 0.218 0.127 -0.00280
[0.112] [0.0693] [0.0962]
Living alone (d) -0.0122 -0.0949 -0.210
[0.113] [0.0755] [0.112]
Number children -0.0329 -0.0268 -0.0210
[0.0170] [0.0145] [0.0163]
Low education (ISCED 1/2) (d) -0.232 0.127 0.541**
[0.148] [0.0835] [0.209]
Middle education (ISCED 3/4) (d) -0.331* 0.0976 0.396***
[0.135] [0.0690] [0.0971]
High education (ISCED 5/6) (d) -0.290* 0.145* 0.495***
[0.136] [0.0717] [0.120]
Living in village <10.000 (d) 0.132* 0.00389 -0.109**
[0.0534] [0.0477] [0.0409]
Living in city 10.000-500.000 (d) 0.0814 -0.0369 -0.149**
[0.0485] [0.0348] [0.0481]
Living in city >500.000 (d) 0.105 -0.0160 -0.117**
[0.0660] [0.0396] [0.0359]
Belonging to upper class (d) -0.0208 0.0179 -0.00327
[0.118] [0.0752] [0.0488]
Belonging to middle class (d) 0.111* 0.0710 0.0264
[0.0554] [0.0443] [0.0584]
Belonging to working class (d) 0.0895 0.0531 0.0108
[0.0564] [0.0464] [0.0639]
Belonging to lower class (d) -0.257** -0.254*** -0.261**
[0.0900] [0.0771] [0.0919]
Chiefearner (d) 0.538*** 0.510*** 0.490***
Continued on next page...
32... table 8 continued
MOTHERS 25-40 MOTHERS 25-54 MOTHERS 40-54
[0.0268] [0.0301] [0.0388]
Catholic (d) 0.0108 -0.0275 -0.0512
[0.0358] [0.0279] [0.0379]
Protestant (d) 0.0188 0.00802 -0.00628
[0.0199] [0.0197] [0.0275]
Other denomination (d) -0.00113 -0.0478 -0.0856
[0.0221] [0.0326] [0.0441]
Living with parents (d) 0.124* 0.0666 -0.00732
[0.0517] [0.0518] [0.0622]
Female Unemploymentrate -0.0152 0.0245 0.0893
[0.0184] [0.0126] [0.0479]
Female unemploymentrate x low education 0.00189 -0.0442*** -0.123**
[0.0166] [0.00965] [0.0470]
Female unemploymentrate x middle education 0.0156 -0.0362*** -0.120*
[0.0165] [0.00975] [0.0490]
Female unemploymentrate x high education 0.0196 -0.0322** -0.116*
[0.0149] [0.0101] [0.0466]
GDP p.a. (% change) -0.0473** -0.0186 0.0140
[0.0172] [0.0138] [0.0121]
GDP p.c. in TUSD (PPP) 0.0617*** 0.0337** 0.00547
[0.0154] [0.0117] [0.0116]
Size service sector (TUSD per working capita) -49.52*** -24.59*** -5.809
[9.206] [6.594] [7.451]
Average religiosity per country (strong) 1.524*** 0.527* -0.349
[0.307] [0.212] [0.224]
Constant yes yes yes
N 3584 7012 3748
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold); Empty cells: results not computable.
Table 9: Probit regression models with alternative measures of religiosity (marginal ef-
fects)





Family cash benets (1) -0.0606* -0.0601* -0.059*
[0.0314] [0.0348] [0.0335]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.307*** 0.310*** 0.319***
[0.0327] [0.0392] [0.0336]
Religion very important (d,1) -0.1105*** -0.0946***
[0.0236] [0.0264]
Religion very important x cash benets (1) -0.0049* -0.0031*
[0.0019] [0.0016]
Religion very important x benets in kind (1) -0.0175*** -0.0165***
[0.0025] [0.0031]
Actively religious (1) -0.072** -0.0339
[0.0242] [0.0299]
Actively religious x cash benets (1) -0.0032 -0.0013
[0.0212] [0.0015]
Actively religious x benets in kind (1) -0.014*** 0.0072
[0.0043] [0.0060]
25-29 years old (d) -0.0620** -0.0632** -0.0627**
[0.0226] [0.0224] [0.0229]
Continued on next page...






35-40 years old (d) 0.0196 0.0209 0.0198
[0.0238] [0.0237] [0.0235]
Married (d) 0.302 0.310* 0.305
[0.157] [0.153] [0.156]
Living unmarried with a partner (d) 0.219 0.226* 0.219
[0.113] [0.108] [0.113]
Living alone (d) -0.00695 -0.00273 -0.00650
[0.115] [0.111] [0.115]
Number children -0.0335 -0.0349* -0.0331
[0.0173] [0.0176] [0.0173]
Low education (ISCED 1/2) (d) -0.215 -0.208 -0.219
[0.150] [0.146] [0.151]
Middle education (ISCED 3/4) (d) -0.316* -0.308* -0.320*
[0.138] [0.134] [0.138]
High education (ISCED 5/6) (d) -0.277* -0.267* -0.278*
[0.138] [0.136] [0.140]
Living in village <10.000 (d) 0.129* 0.135** 0.132*
[0.0532] [0.0516] [0.0514]
Living in city 10.000-500.000 (d) 0.0758 0.0853 0.0793
[0.0480] [0.0499] [0.0488]
Living in city >500.000 (d) 0.101 0.107 0.104
[0.0644] [0.0668] [0.0650]
Belonging to upper class (d) -0.0255 -0.0334 -0.0280
[0.113] [0.114] [0.114]
Belonging to middle class (d) 0.108 0.112* 0.108
[0.0556] [0.0560] [0.0560]
Belonging to working class (d) 0.0852 0.0911 0.0855
[0.0564] [0.0562] [0.0563]
Belonging to lower class (d) -0.257** -0.255** -0.257**
[0.0886] [0.0901] [0.0884]
Chiefearner (d) 0.537*** 0.536*** 0.537***
[0.0275] [0.0268] [0.0273]
Catholic (d) 0.0102 0.0134 0.0144
[0.0349] [0.0308] [0.0318]
Protestant (d) 0.0170 0.0133 0.0184
[0.0194] [0.0169] [0.0182]
Other denomination (d) 0.00108 -0.0110 0.00447
[0.0237] [0.0217] [0.0227]
Living with parents (d) 0.122* 0.122* 0.123*
[0.0520] [0.0536] [0.0529]
Female Unemploymentrate -0.0153 -0.0131 -0.0156
[0.0186] [0.0187] [0.0187]
Female unemploymentrate x low education 0.00110 -0.000337 0.00152
[0.0166] [0.0163] [0.0168]
Female unemploymentrate x middle education 0.0149 0.0139 0.0155
[0.0167] [0.0163] [0.0167]
Female unemploymentrate x high education 0.0195 0.0177 0.0197
[0.0149] [0.0149] [0.0151]
GDP p.a. (% change) -0.0456** -0.0484** -0.0466**
[0.0170] [0.0172] [0.0167]
GDP p.c. in TUSD (PPP) 0.0605*** 0.0619*** 0.0607***
[0.0148] [0.0157] [0.0149]
Size service sector (TUSD per working capita) -48.86*** -49.17*** -48.74***
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Average religiosity per country (strong) 1.504*** 1.487*** 1.498***
[0.300] [0.318] [0.312]
Constant yes yes yes
N 3584 3584 3584
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold).
Table 10: Probit regression models with dierent aspects of denomination with regard





VARIABLES OF INTEREST Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant
Family cash benets (1) -0.3159** -0.174** -0.362***
[0.1239] [0.0618] [0.0587]
Family benets in kind (1) 0.00559 0.601*** 0.424*** 0.243***
[0.126] [0.0532] [0.0457] [0.0678]
Strong religious ties (d,1) -0.0363 -0.1845*** -0.1472*** -0.1244
[0.0534] [0.0455] [0.0261] [0.1102]
Strong religious ties x cash benets (1) -0.0048 -0.0118** -0.0775*** 0.0381*
[0.0051] [0.0050] [0.0229] [0.0196]
Strong religious ties x benets in kind (1) 0.0001 -0.0407*** -0.0261*** -0.0264*
[0.0020] [0.0087] [0.0040] [0.0139]
CONTROL VARIABLES
25-29 years old (d) 0.0337 -0.0710 -0.0640* -0.0216
[0.0467] [0.0467] [0.0315] [0.0262]
35-40 years old (d) 0.0663*** -0.0263 0.00408 0.0860
[0.0196] [0.0301] [0.0241] [0.0452]
Married (d) 0.140 0.582* 0.302 0.0471
[0.363] [0.257] [0.159] [0.378]
Living unmarried with a partner (d) 0.0180 0.408** 0.221 -0.0420
[0.342] [0.134] [0.120] [0.378]
Living alone (d) -0.136 0.251 -0.00391 -0.302
[0.320] [0.267] [0.115] [0.366]
Number children -0.0491 -0.0202 -0.0208 -0.0607
[0.0284] [0.0233] [0.0207] [0.0375]
Low education (ISCED 1/2) (d) -0.391** -0.00926 -0.210
[0.140] [0.246] [0.159]
Middle education (ISCED 3/4) (d) -0.548*** -0.0246 -0.302
[0.131] [0.291] [0.164]
High education (ISCED 5/6) (d) -0.454*** -0.0624 -0.175
[0.134] [0.251] [0.147]
Living in village <10.000 (d) -0.364* 0.259*** 0.0469
[0.154] [0.0312] [0.0703]
Living in city 10.000-500.000 (d) -0.384** 0.261*** 0.00556 -0.0698**
[0.148] [0.0418] [0.0505] [0.0226]
Living in city >500.000 (d) -0.357* 0.275*** 0.0366 -0.0313
[0.177] [0.0518] [0.0868] [0.0516]
Belonging to upper class (d) -0.153 0.116 0.0867 -0.428*
[0.197] [0.0741] [0.133] [0.181]
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Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant
Belonging to middle class (d) 0.0306 0.102 0.158** -0.136
[0.100] [0.0608] [0.0521] [0.0924]
Belonging to working class (d) -0.00292 -0.208 0.150** -0.198*
[0.0978] [0.161] [0.0483] [0.0785]
Belonging to lower class (d) -0.273* 0.531*** -0.220* -0.486***
[0.110] [0.0422] [0.103] [0.0590]
Chiefearner (d) 0.568*** 0.0948 0.549*** 0.503***
[0.0237] [0.0871] [0.0306] [0.0421]
Catholic (d) -0.0488 0.0992***
[0.0323] [0.0193]
Protestant (d) -0.0205* 0.114***
[0.00961] [0.0262]
Other denomination (d) -0.00454 -0.0281
[0.0264] [0.0452]
Living with parents (d) 0.0780 -0.00297 0.108 0.168***
[0.0703] [0.0551] [0.0832] [0.0457]
Female Unemploymentrate -0.0859* -0.0399 -0.0746** -0.773***
[0.0403] [0.0551] [0.0231] [0.0270]
Female unemploymentrate x low education 0.0149 -0.0367 0.00760 0.743***
[0.0168] [0.0592] [0.0229] [0.0237]
Female unemploymentrate x middle education 0.0376 -0.0253 0.0136 0.748***
[0.0218] [0.0548] [0.0264] [0.0243]
Female unemploymentrate x high education 0.0375* -0.0843*** 0.00696 0.770***
[0.0190] [0.0149] [0.0207] [0.0233]
GDP p.a. (% change) 0.0408 0.111*** -0.00105
[0.0455] [0.0141] [0.0177]
GDP p.c. in TUSD (PPP) -0.0163 -121.2*** 0.0553*** 0.000483
[0.0443] [9.876] [0.00964] [0.00144]
Size service sector (TUSD per working capita) 3.794 3.430*** -90.43***
[30.32] [0.296] [10.09]
Average religiosity per country (strong) -0.863 0.276*** 1.881***
[1.290] [0.0309] [0.314]
Constant yes yes yes yes
N 1007 1309 2544 1040
Note: Standard errors in brackets; Marginal eects evaluated at the mean; (1) variables computed as composite eects;
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1; *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1 (signicant variables
of interest in bold); Catholic countries: CAN, CZE, ESP, Protestant countries: AUS, FIN, GER, NZE, NOR, SWE, USA;
Empty cells: results not computable.
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